AN

ESSAY

ON THE

DISTINCTION

BETWEEN THE

SOUL and BODY of MAN.

BRITISH MUSEUM

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By JOHN ROTHERAM, M. A. k

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SOUL and BODY of MAN.

AN attentive obſerver will diſcover ſome properties in Matter that are fugitive and variable; others fixed and permanent under every condition and circumſtance. By remarking theſe he will come at length to diſtinguiſh the native properties that belong to it as matter, from the adventitious and aſſumed. After paſſing through a thouſand changing appearances, the Proteus hath been bound at laſt in the Chain of Experiment,

ment, and made to diſcover itſelf in its real form to the eye of the Philoſopher; who hath thus been enabled to inveſtigate the natural *inactivity* of matter amidſt that infinite variety of *action* in which it is perpetually engaged. Suſceptible alike of every motion, it is in itſelf devoid of the power of motion. It receives indifferently, and obeys implicitly every outward impulſe, without manifeſting any tendency of its own, any power of ſelf-direction. It is therefore poſſeſſed of no ſuch power, or never exerts it, which amounts to the ſame thing. For a power ever latent, and therefore ever uſeleſs, is not admitted in true philoſophy.

The natural inactivity of matter qualifies it however for being acted upon. Without the power of moving itſelf, it is moſt moveable. Inert, and devoid of all abſolute and eſſential power, it became the more apt to receive the relative powers. Such are thoſe of Attraction and Repulſion, the powerful ſprings which firſt actuated, and ever ſince keep in motion, the various parts of the material ſyſtem. Whether theſe powers are originally diſtinct, or are the reſult of one general law, by which every particle of matter has a tendency to every other particle, they may properly be conſidered as relative powers; becauſe their action and effect depend upon an outward relation. They could never give motion to a ſingle and ſolitary particle of matter. But let others be produced, and then theſe powers which ſeem not to reſide ſeparately in any, will appear in the influence they have over all.

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It is by theſe powers that matter is conducted through that endleſs variety of

forms

forms which we ſee it aſſume. By them it is led through the maze of infinite combinations in which it never ceaſes to run; the alternate labour of generation and diſſolution; whereby corruption becomes fruitful, and one ſet of beings ariſes in ſucceſſion on the ruins of another. It is by theſe that inanimate nature ſeems in ſome meaſure to be enlivened, and teems with unnumbered claſſes of mineral and vegetable productions. It is by theſe that the wonderful proceſs of vegetation is carried on, and the plant is made to paſs ſucceſſively through the ſtate of increaſe, maturity, and decay. By theſe the materials are conſtructed into tubes, and woven into leaves; the fluid aſcends, perſpires, or ſubſides; the various ſecretions are performed, and the nutritive particles ſelected and aſſimilated.

What ſome have thought proper to dignify with the title of the Soul of Plants, ſeems indeed to be no more than the united action of thoſe attractive and repulſive powers with which the ſeveral parts of the plant, in common with all other matter, are endued. For what elſe is a plant than a ſtructure raiſed by an aſſemblage and arrangement of ſuitable materials? and what other operation does this require than the attraction of certain parts, and the ſeparation of others?

The ſoul of plants then, if the expreſſion may be uſed, ſeems to be no more than a particular application of that general power which is diffuſed throughout the whole maſs of matter. It is no Genius created to animate and inform the plant; no Dryad that dwells in the Oak. The mutual influence of the parts concerned in the production of the plant, is by their peculiar ſituation determined to that harmonius effect, which gives birth to ſo admirable a ſtructure.

Why

As this active power does not ſpring with the plant, ſo neither can it be ſaid to periſh with it. It is not extinguiſhed nor diſſipated into air, but ſubſiſts as truly in the withering leaf as in the vigorous bud; in the duſt to which the plant is reduced, as in the ſeed from which it ſprings. That particular arrangement of the parts which conſtitutes a plant is deſtroyed. But neither the matter which compoſed the body, nor the power which was called the ſoul of the plant is loſt. The ſame power erects the ſame materials into a fabric of a different kind. The aſhes of one plant yield nouriſhment to another; and that attractive force which lately compacted the fibres of a vegitable, now petrifies them into a ſtony maſs, or works them perhaps into the ſubſtance of an animal.

Amidſt all the admirable forms into which matter, aided by this plaſtic power, is wrought, it ſeems however that the whole operation of this power conſiſts merely in giving motion and direction to matter; in drawing together or diſperſing its fineſt particles. It follows that this power is dependent on matter, and cannot ſubſiſt in a ſtate of ſeparation from it. For of a power which conſiſts in giving certain motions or poſitions to matter, what conception can we form if matter is abſtracted? Or what can remain of a power founded on a relation, when the relation itſelf is taken away?

True

true
nothing

Let us ſee if we ſhall be led to the ſame concluſion with regard to the Soul of Man; if its powers be alſo relative, and dependent on matter.

We are conſcious within ourſelves of an active power; a power that does not, like thoſe we have been already conſidering, depend on any precarious ſituation of things without; that does not become more intenſe or more languid by the approach or receſs of the bodies that ſurround us. We begin motion, encreaſe, retard, and direct it from our own determination alone. We are ſovereign and arbitrary in the exerciſe of this power, not moved by any foreign impulſe, nor waiting the concurrence of outward bodies. This is not then a relative, but an inherent power, and hath its origin wholly within ourſelves.

Difference
between
Relative
inherent

Where ſhall we ſay that a power like this reſides? Is it a power ſuperadded to that portion of matter of which our bodies are framed, and aſſociated with thoſe other properties which it hath in common with the whole inanimate maſs? Such an aſſociation ſeems at firſt ſight unnatural, and hardly reconcileable with the ways of infinite wiſdom in the management of the creation. Things are adapted to certain ends, and regularly applied to them. Properties are not given, removed, and exchanged in a new and arbitrary manner; they are neither introduced where they did not originally ſubſiſt, nor eradicated where they were at firſt implanted. It is no deviation from this regular plan that the ſame matter is wrought into very different bodies, and enters perhaps by turns into the ſervice of every element. This is no more than a diſplay of the ſame properties under different circumſtances: the change is here ſuperficial and accidental, ariſing from ſome new combination or connection, and ſtill carried on in ſubſerviency to thoſe general laws which were at firſt eſtabliſhed.

But let us conſider what paſſes within ourſelves. If we examine our own bodies, we find them to be conſtructed of vulgar materials. The matter with which they are enlarged, ſupported, and repaired, is common matter, the fleſh of animals, or the vegetable productions of the earth. It is reaſonable to think that the ſame common nouriſhment ſupplies all parts of our bodies, even thoſe of the moſt exquiſite workmanſhip. But to compleat the experiment, let us view them in ruins. We here have acceſs to the moſt concealed parts; we trace every ſecret channel, and inſpect the innermoſt receſſes, the ſtrong holds of life. If our own ſcrutiny hath not penetrated far enough, corruption will at length give us full ſatisfaction. That nice Anatomiſt ſuffers nothing to eſcape him. He analyſes the minuteſt parts, and ſhews whereof the ſtructure is made, by reducing the whole to duſt, common duſt, which goes to feed a blade of graſs, or is kneaded into a lump of clay.

Such is the body of man in its origin, and in its fall. Plants derive their ſubſtance from the earth. On theſe we feed, and our bodies repay again to the earth what the vegetable had borrowed from it. Such is the circulation. There are no traces of this active principle in the matter from which our bodies are prepared, no remains of it in that into which they are reſolved.

If then we hold that power with which we are endowed above the common maſs to be no more than a property of matter, how ſhall we account for its appearance only at the time when it compoſes our bodies? Shall we ſay that the active principle was in reality ſtill inherent in ſome finer matter, but being encumbered and oppreſſed by the groſſer parts was hindered from exerting itſelf, and thus remained latent in the common maſs: that it is prepared and partly diſentangled in the courſe of vegetation, and at laſt entirely ſet free in the animal ſtate: but that after a ſhort enjoyment of liberty, by its concourſe with groſſer matter it is again enveloped, and once more ſunk and buried in common earth? This hypotheſis having not yet been embraced need not be refuted. It brings us back however to another, which hath been already mentioned, and which, though it hath its favourers, does not ſeem to ſtand more clear of difficulties. For can it be thought probable that a portion of matter taken from the common maſs ſhould be for a while inveſted with a property entirely new, and ſoon after deſpoiled of it? This is a ſingularity breaking through the eſtabliſhed order of things, a violation of that uniformity which beautifies and gives an union to the various parts of the creation. According to this hypotheſis, matter is taken out of its natural ſtate, is made to act for a while a part ſuperior to itſelf, and then again degraded, and returned back to its humbler original. A double violence to nature. For the irregularity is equal: to give the new property, and to deſtroy it.

nature
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for
Know not

Some urge the objection ſtill farther. They ſay that the ſuperaddition of this remarkable quality is not only unnatural but impoſſible. For how can that which is conſtitutionally inactive be endowed with a principle of action? It muſt be confeſſed indeed that matter cannot be at the ſame time active and inert; naturally indiſpoſed to action, and yet maſter of an inward power of ſelf direction. One of theſe qualities muſt ever exclude the other. This at leaſt therefore ſeems to be certain, that the conſtitution of matter muſt be altered to prepare it for the reception of this new power. Enough to load the hypotheſis we are at preſent conſidering with an high degree of inconſiſtency.

For if we content ourſelves with obſerving what Omnipotence does, without attempting to determine what it can do, the ſuppoſed change in matter can hardly appear natural. To deprive it of its diſtinguiſhing inactivity; to furniſh it with a principle that contradicts its firſt character; again to reverſe the change, to ſink it from this new elevation, and to leave it once more inactive: is ſuch a confuſion of properties as can hardly be reconciled to the ways of creative wiſdom, whatever may ſeem poſſible to creative power.

But we are not diſtinguiſhed from common matter by a principle of ſelf direction only. This may perhaps ſeem leſs remote from the capacity of matter, ſince whatever the principle itſelf may be its operation has a manifeſt relation to matter. If matter cannot of itſelf begin to move, it is however ſuſceptible of motion.

But we are endowed with other powers to which matter ſeems not to have even the moſt diſtant relation. For what have extenſion, figure, and motion to do with perception, and all the powers of thinking? Matter may furniſh all that we admire in the viſible creation; but we can never conceive it to be the baſis of a thought, or the ſubſtance of an idea.

actions
[illegible]
Horse
dog

Substance of
Idea

We can eaſily apprehend that every viſible part of our frame was conſtructed from ~~it;~~ Matter we can diſcern it throughout all the wonderful organization of our bodies, twiſted into fibres, woven into membranes of the moſt delicate texture, formed into tubes of admirable fineneſs, and flowing through theſe channels in ſtreams of the ſubtileſt fluid: nay more, we can conceive it in the touch to excite the nervous papillæ; in the hearing to ſtrike in undulations differently modulated on the tympanum of the ear; in viſion, to flow in ſtreams of light from every illuminated object, to be refracted through the humid chryſtal of the eye, and with an inimitable pencil to draw on that web of admirable texture which is ſtretched out behind it, the images of every thing around us: we can conceive the peculiar ſyſtem of nerves belonging to each of theſe organs to be put in motion, and the vibrations to be propagated through an elaſtic ſolid or fluid to the brain:——all this we can conceive: but when we would proceed a ſtep beyond this we are loſt. We ſeem to be arrived at the edge of a precipice where matter with its ſolidity can ſupport us no farther. For what is this elaſtic ſpring, this playing of the fibres, this agitation of our whole frame, to ſenſe and perception? We are arrived at a new creation, an ideal world, whoſe furniture and whoſe laws are totally different from the material.

Horse

Socrates
Epictetus

Can we then believe that it is ſtill the ſame ſubſtance which we diſcover under all theſe new appearances? Can it be matter which thinks, the ſame matter which we borrow from the earth and pay back to it again? No wonder that it hath been often miſtaken for a new ſubſtance. Nothing can be more different from itſelf. Thoſe well-known properties diſappear by which it was become familiar to us, and it is furniſhed with others of a new character. If it be in reality matter which appears at one time ſolid, extended, figured, and moveable;

able; at another, feels pleaſure and pain, perceives, wills, and reaſons; we muſt allow at leaſt that it is in this latter ſtate a very different kind of matter from what it is in the former; a matter which retains nothing but the name.

another

Shall we then take refuge in an hypotheſis which entertains us with this ſtrange tranſmutation of matter; which ſuppoſes it to be ſtripped of its native qualities and inveſted with ſuch as are utterly foreign to it; whilſt another more ſimple and natural lies open before us?

Where there is an aſſemblage of properties and powers accompanying each other, inſeparable, and always appearing in ſtrict and intimate union, we ſuppoſe them to inhere in ſome common ſubject. For properties muſt be the properties of ſomething. The ſubject to which theſe united properties belong, and by which they are ſupported, is called the ſubſtance or ſubſtratum.

When there are two diſtinct aſſemblages of properties and powers, connected amongſt themſelves, but without any certain common connection, it ſeems moſt natural to ſuppoſe that they are two diſtinct ſubſtances.

We obſerve certain qualities in whatever we ſee or touch, and diſcern a natural connection amongſt them. Extenſion leads to ſolidity, or the excluſion of every other body from that ſpace which it already fills. With this is connected mobility, or a capacity of filling ſucceſſively any other equal part of ſpace; and diviſibility, or a ſeparation of the parts of ſolid extenſion; with all the train of properties depending on figure and motion. To theſe united qualities, or to their common ſupport, we give the general name of matter, or material ſubſtance.

We have within ourſelves qualities and powers of a very different kind. We perceive and feel, we think, reflect, deſire, and chooſe. Perception is the ſource of ideas. The mind compares them, marks their relations, retains, recalls, and variouſly combines them. Upon theſe are exerciſed memory, imagination, reaſon and judgment; and by theſe are awakened inſtincts, paſſions, and will. Their influence is reciprocal, they mutually incite, check, and regulate each other. Theſe properties and powers, entirely diſtinct from the former aſſociation, but united amongſt themſelves, ſeem to have a claim no leſs juſt than the former to be conſidered as a diſtinct ſubſtance. To theſe therefore, or to their common ſupport, by a negative term of diſtinction from the former ſubſtance, is given the name of immaterial ſubſtance; or, in one word, by a poſitive expreſſion, the name of Spirit.

And this on the ſame principles as in the former caſe. There are two combinations of qualities, of characters totally different and diſtinct from each other. The connection running through each is clear and acknowledged by all. We diſcover by ſenſe the union amongſt the material qualities; by conſciouſneſs the union amongſt the mental. But neither ſenſe nor conſciouſneſs inform us of any property, power, or quality that they poſſeſs in common. We gain our intelligence concerning them from different quarters. All our information concerning the properties of matter comes from without; concerning the ſpiritual powers from within. They are therefore differently derived and of different deſcent. They do not branch out from one common ſtock, nor can we trace them up to the ſame original. They are of two different families, diſtinct, unallied, and independent on each other. And he, who, beginning firſt to combine into a ſubſtance the material qualities, ſhould ſay that the ſpiritual are ſuperadded; may with juſt as much reaſon begin by eſtabliſhing the combination of ſpiritual powers, and ſuppoſe the material to be added.

Et is man

It is true they are in the perſon of man united. But their union is the contracted union of two different ſubſtances; not the union of kindred properties in the ſame ſubſtance.

This is 2 men

By virtue of this myſterious union they act upon each other. But their reciprocal action, with every other circumſtance, tends to mark their different nature. The mind *wills*, and matter is *put in motion.* Matter is *impreſſed upon the ſenſes*, and the mind *feels*. Can the powers acting be of the ſame nature, where both the action and the effect are ſo widely different? For whether we conſider the action as beginning in the mind or terminating in it, both the action and the reſult appear eſſentially to differ from that which proceeds from or terminates in matter.

If the mind be material, then by the action of matter upon the mind, nothing could be produced but what matter could effect acting upon matter. That is, the effect would be merely mechachanical. If that were the caſe, the impreſſion upon the mind would be a ſubject of mathematical calculation; the effect would be certain and invariable; and NEWTON would have diſcovered the laws of action between body and mind with the ſame truth and preciſion as he has done the laws of motion.

Ev

Matter acts upon matter by motion and impulſe. Matter in motion acting upon matter by impulſe ſeems incapable of producing any other effect than to change its form, to give motion or to deſtroy it, to accelerate or to retard. The external matter gives a certain motion or configuration to the organ of ſenſe. The organ by its fibres or its fluid may make a ſimilar impreſſion upon the material mind, or give it a ſimilar motion. But no other effect can ariſe, unleſs you ſuppoſe a new and unknown kind of matter, acting by laws entirely different from all known matter, and poſseſsing different and unknown powers: that is, matter differing in every reſpect from what is underſtood by the name of matter.

But if the effect produced upon the mind by the action of matter be only a change of motion or form, then ſenſation can be no more than ſuch a change; and an idea produced by ſenſation can be no more than ſome particles of the mind put into motion or form. Accordingly, they who have laboured to prove the mind material, have framed two hypotheſes; endeavouring to account for all ſenſation by Impreſsion and Vibration.

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Sound -
not
matter
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On either ſuppoſition the effect would be determined by the force of the impulſe;

pulſe; and that being given, both the vigour and the duration of the idea might be exactly meaſured. The Impreſſion would be ſuperficial or deep, the vibration would be ſtrong or weak in proportion to the force with which the object ſtrikes upon the ſenſe. And the ſenſation or idea, if we ſuppoſe it an effect purely material, would follow the ſame law.

But this Theory is contrary to all experience. For the ſame object preſented to the ſenſe produces effects different according to the diſpoſition of the mind itſelf, and not merely according to the force or power of the object. The mind itſelf has a power of applying or withdrawing its attention, and thereby of encreaſing or diminiſhing the effect, and of lengthening the impreſſion at pleaſure, or ſpeedily effacing it. We behold one mo-

Not
true

moment with delight an object, which at another we look upon with indifference, or turn away from with averſion and diſguſt. Without regard to the ſtrength or weakneſs of the impreſſion the mind itſelf can generally determine its duration. It can retain the idea, however excited, long after the object hath ceaſed to act, and far beyond the meaſure of its action. It can lengthen the delight produced by the gentler vibrations of the ſofteſt ſounds, or by the ſight of poliſhed and elegant forms; whilſt it ſoon diſmiſſes the image of rough and ill-proportioned bodies, and forgets the harſher tones of diſcordant muſick. It can retain the colouring laid on by the pencil of the ſofter violet tints; and efface the image drawn by the fiercer ray of red.

So that the time of the idea is in many caſes entirely in the power of the mind: which could not be if the idea were merely an image impreſſed upon matter, or a vibration excited in ſome elaſtic body. For then, if the mind be a ſubſtance vibrating and elaſtic, the idea would be commenſurate to the ſtroke received through the organ of ſenſe. It would neceſſarily follow the law of its vibration, and being at firſt vigorous and ſtrong, would grow fainter and weaker as the oſcillations are ſhortened, and diminiſh by a regular ſcale from the point of impulſe to the point of reſt.

If an idea be called an impreſſion of matter upon matter, ſimilar concluſions will follow. If the impreſſion be made upon matter fluid or ſoft, it would diſappear either inſtantly or gradually, and the idea would accompany it through its changes from deep and ſtrong, to faint and evaneſcent. If upon an harder ſubſtance, or one yielding to receive the impreſſion, and hardening to retain it, then our ideas would be fixed as characters engraven on a rock. But nothing reſembling theſe laws, either of regular and gradual weakening from the time of impulſe to the point of evaneſcence, or of forcible poſſeſſion and ſtubborn duration, hath ever been obſerved to take place with regard to ideas. They are not ſubject to the laws of motion: their duration is not determinable by momentum and impulſe: the mind itſelf has a power, in many caſes arbitrary, to retain or diſmiſs them; by applying or withdrawing its attention to ſtrengthen or ſubdue them; to ſupport them for ſome time in equal degrees of vivacity; or to cauſe them ſuddenly

no

to diſappear in undiminiſhed force and vigour.

If an idea be a vibration, then it may be aſked, wherein conſiſts the idea of a vibration itſelf ? Vibrations are ſuppoſed to repreſent every other object, what is it that repreſents this univerſal repreſentative ? If a vibration ; then is it a vibration of a vibration, and the idea is confounded with its object.

If it be ſaid that an inward vibration is the fitteſt repreſentative of an outward, then how can it repreſent any thing beſides a vibration? For to repreſent any other object it muſt be differently modified. But vibrations are diſtinguiſhed only by quicker or ſlower, by the greater or leſs extent of their oſcillations. On this ſuppoſition, ideas would all be ſubſtantially the ſame, differing only in their modes and circumſtances. On this ſuppoſition, the ideas of every ſenſe would coincide; and the idea of a roſe would be diſtinguiſhed from the idea of a muſical ſound only by its degrees of velocity: that is, it would be diſtinguiſhed by a mode whereof it ſeems by no means to be ſuſceptible.

If vibrations may be applicable to any claſs of Ideas, they ſhould ſeem moſt naturally to belong to the ideas of hearing. For by hearing alone the effect of vibrations is perceived. From vibrations the eye and the touch perceive nothing but ſilent motion. To the ear alone they become vocal and ſonorous.

Hearing

But if the perception of ſound be no more than the vibration of ſome inward elaſtic body correſpondent to that of the outward elaſtic by which it is excited, then wherein do the two vibrations differ? If they differ no otherwiſe than as the vibration of two different ſtrings in uniſon, then is the inward, like the outward, a mere vibration; all is ſilence ſtill; and the mind is as far from the perception of ſound as the muſical chord. A vibrating chord is not ſound, it is merely a chord in motion. Sound therefore cannot be awakened in the mind without ſomething beyond the power of mere vibration.

But if mere vibration cannot account for the ideas of hearing, its own appropriated organ, through which its chief effects are produced; how muſt this doctrine be applied to the ideas of every other ſenſe, with which we are not ſure that vibrations have any connection or concern?

If the mind be matter it muſt be extended over a certain ſpace; it muſt have figure and dimenſions, be a ſuperficies or a ſolid, bounded by lines or ſurfaces. Every idea muſt occupy a part of this ſpace, from which every other idea will be excluded.

If a mere ſurface, plain or concave, it may be overſpread with a picture of outward objects beautiful and juſt, but can give no exact repreſentation of ſolid bodies. If this picture be called an aſſemblage of ideas, then it remains to be enquired wherein this picture differs from any other picture? If it differ not, how is it more than a picture, and how are its images perceived and felt?

If ſolid matter, either an entire ſolid, or a ſolid ſurrounding a vacuum, then the repreſentation of objects in all their dimenſions may be molded in the ſolid itſelf, or may be introduced into the included vacuum, as the furniture in a room. Theſe ſolid repreſentations muſt be of a texture hard and firm, elſe how can the mind retain its ideas? Yet they muſt be ſufficiently ſoft and yielding inſtantly to admit of new ſhapes, elſe how ſhall we account for the quick ſucceſſion and change of ideas? What becomes of the old furniture when new is continually introduced? In what hidden cells are theſe ſolid ideas lodged, that they may be produced again in good repair when wanted to fill the apartments of memory? What gives life to theſe figures; and how are they perceived and felt?

For, not to dwell on the difficulties that meet us in the way, let it be allowed that by the action of groſſer bodies without upon ſome finer matter within, compleat pictures or images may be formed, perfectly correſponding with the external object, purſuing it in every motion, and reflecting every change of form. You have then found a Microcoſm; a miniature world of matter; a hidden repoſitory of forms perfectly agreeing with the outward forms. But ſtill the queſtion recurs, how are theſe forms perceived? The forms within are no more perception themſelves, than the forms without. They are ſtill no more than material forms, the ſenſe and perception of which is wanting.

For, in a word, the queſtion is not about the production of images or forms, but about the ſenſe and perception of them. We are not in ſearch of matter figured, moving, or at reſt. That we find in the material world without. Nor of thoſe images and repreſentations of outward bodies which are prepared by the organs of ſenſe: but our enquiry is after ſenſe itſelf.

If ſenſe be ſaid to be nothing more than matter figured and moving, then ſenſe differs not from the world without us; and every external object, having all the requiſites of ſenſe, is itſelf ſentient. If ſenſe be nothing more than the true images and repreſentations of outward objects, ſuch as are believed to be formed by the organs of ſenſe, then the pictures of outward objects formed on the retina of the eye will be ſenſe, as much as any picture or repreſentation of the ſame object formed in the brain, or in that matter, wherever lodged, which is called mind.

So that in this ſuppoſition theſe three things, in themſelves moſt diſtinct, are confounded: the outward material world; the organ through which it is perceived; and the power perceiving.

vide Socrates

Allow the material object ſtriking upon the organ of ſenſe to produce in that matter which is called mind, its compleat reſemblance; this image formed within, however true and perfect, can be no idea till it be perceived. For if a compleat image of an external object be an idea though not perceived, then the pictures on the retina of the eye are ideas. Perception therefore cannot be accounted for, without the aſſiſtance of ſome new powers, differing from, and ſurpaſſing all the known powers of matter.

Perception is the firſt and loweſt operation of the mind. If then the action of matter upon matter cannot account for the formation and perception of the ideas of ſenſe, how will it account for all the higher operations of the mind? ideas of ſenſe are but the firſt elements of thought: and the produce raiſed from theſe elements by the operation of the mind upon them is as far ſuperiour to the elements themſelves in variety, copiouſneſs and uſe, as books are to the characters of which they are compoſed. How ſhall he who is ignorant of the uſe of letters, write an hiſtory, or a poem? If matter acting upon matter cannot account for the production of the elementary ideas, how can it account for all that is accompliſhed by the action of the mind upon them?

P

Ev

What is it that recalls, compares, and combines them; that marks their connections and diſtinctions; that arranges, claſſes, and reduces them into order? What is it that reflects and reaſons, that wills, deliberates, and determines; that ſees in the agreement of ideas ſelf evident truths, and ſtarting from theſe firſt principles, purſues a train of reaſoning to its remoteſt conſequences: that, taking its departure from a falling leaf, riſes to the heavens; deſcends again to the deep; penetrates through the whole œconomy of nature; and brings to light the univerſal law which agitates the ocean in its bed, directs the earth in its motion, and guides all the heavenly bodies in their courſes? Is all this no more than ſome impreſſion or repercuſſion of matter upon matter? Is reflection the pulſe of ſome muſical chord; and philo-

Epicte
fr.

Newton

loſophic reaſoning the full harmony of tuneful vibrations?

An attempt hath been made to account for the higher operations of the mind by the power of aſſociation. It is true the ideas of things often recur to the mind in the ſame order and connection in which they were firſt preſented to the ſenſe: and the ſight, or the recollection of one object, though now ſingle, introduces into the mind another, or a train of other objects, with which it was formerly connected.

aſſoci
tion

And did things always appear in the ſame rank and order in which they were firſt made known to us, there might be ſome colour of reaſon for the ſuppoſition that an involuntary aſſociation was the

idee

cauſe

cauſe of all the mind's ſubſequent operations upon its ideas.

But this is not the caſe. The mind has a power over its own aſſociations. It can alter the firſt diſpoſition of its ideas, ſo as to ſeparate, tranſpoſe, and invert them: it can range and marſhal them in new order, and by a variety of changes and evolutions, can throw them into forms and combinations before unknown.

When a Commander changes the order of his army, he conceives in his mind the new arrangement before he directs the execution; forming his deſign from the nature of the ground they are to occupy, or the diſpoſition of the army againſt which they are to be led. The new arrangement may be totally different from any that he had ſeen before, and in that caſe, cannot be the mechanical effect of former impreſſions. For though he had ſeen lines and ranks, yet he had never ſeen a whole army in all its parts drawn forth in the order in which he now deſigns to form it. Therefore this deſign cannot be produced merely by the force of former aſſociations, but by the power of the mind over its former aſſociations.

Q
Idle

The caſe is the ſame in a thouſand other inſtances, in every ſcience, and every art. The Grammarian in the arrangement of his rules; the Logician of his ſyllogiſms; the Philoſopher of his arguments; the Poet of his machinery and plan; may all purſue a method different from any whereof they had before ſeen an example. If this were not the caſe, there would be an end of all invention. The Painter muſt for ever trace over again the lines of preceding Maſters; and the Statuary could only work after a former model. All would be imitation; there could be no invention, no fiction, none of the lively and ſtriking forms of imagination. The utmoſt effort of the mind would be a bare and naked repreſentation of things as they are: fancy muſt lay aſide her works, and ceaſe from her boldeſt flights: ſhe could no longer kindle the fire of enthuſiaſm in the Poet's breaſt; no longer give life to the marble, or the canvas: all her enchanting viſions would be diſſolved, and all her new creations unpeopled.

Vide
Chat

But this is not all.

2

There is a natural connection between the outward objects of ſenſe, and the ideas excited by them; and a natural aſſociation takes place between the ideas of objects which nature hath connected.

The mind not only commands theſe aſſociations, (as hath appeared) but it creates new aſſociations, arbitrary and of its own invention, and not copied from any example in the external works of nature. And with theſe, as with new inſtruments of its own contrivance, it performs ſeveral works of admirable utility and beauty.

Sounds excite ideas, but ideas of ſound only, and of the ſounds by which they are excited. The mind of man hath directed that a new aſſociation, and one without example in the works of nature, ſhall take place between ſounds and ideas before utterly ſtrangers to each other: ſo that ſounds, under this new direction, not only raiſe ideas of ſounds correſponding with the natural ſound itſelf, but of any other ſound entirely different from itſelf; and not only of ſounds different from itſelf, and of all the objects of the ſenſe of hearing, but ſtill farther of things wherewith ſound hath no natural connection, and of all the objects of every other ſenſe. By which means arbitrary ſounds are made to excite every idea of the mind, and by means of ideas to repreſent every part of nature.

In a way ſimilar to this, new aſſociations unknown to nature are formed between our ideas and objects of ſight.

Lines ſtraight, angular, or curved, exhibited to the eye, naturally excite correſponding ideas. But by the appointment of the mind, new aſſociations are formed, by means of which theſe lines are made to raiſe the idea, not only of lines like themſelves, but of every other line: and not of lines only, but of ſurfaces, ſolids, and every object of ſight: and ſtill farther, not of the objects of ſight alone, but of all the objects of every other ſenſe.

And thus have languages both vocal and written been produced. Sounds not naturally ſignificant are inveſted with meaning; and lines are taught to expreſs the images of things whereof they have no reſemblance. To theſe arbitrary aſſociations do we owe the benefit of language, by means of which the ideas and conceptions of our mind are rendered audible to thoſe who are near us, and viſible to thoſe who are at a diſtance.

Without this contrivance the communication between man and man muſt have been carried on in the moſt imperfect manner; by means only of the few ſounds and ſigns which are naturally ſignificant, and by juſt delineations of things which few could execute. Whereas by words and writing a free intercourſe between different minds is opened; our meaning is fully and clearly expreſſed by that which bears to it no natural reſemblance; our thoughts are fixed and embodied, and ſcience unimpaired is delivered down from age to age. The events, the deſigns, the characters of the primitive ages are made known to modern times; all antiquity is brought forward to our view, and paſt generations of men live again in our ſight. By this conveyance, the wiſdom of ancient days ſaved from the wreck of ages, as a precious fraight in a veſſel well navigated through a long and perilous voyage, is delivered into our hands.

In like manner might the objects of the other ſenſes be made univerſal repreſentatives of the objects and ideas of all the ſenſes. We might have a language of Taſtes and Odours; and there might be an Alphabet of tangible as well as of viſible elements.

Now ſince the mind itſelf has ſuch a power over thoſe aſſociations which are natural, as either to diſunite them, to change their diſpoſition, or to form them into new combinations; and likewiſe poſſeſſes the farther power of creating, for its own uſe, endleſs new aſſociations amongſt things which are by nature utterly disjoined and unconnected: it cannot be that the activity and operations of the mind ſhould ſpring from thoſe aſſociations over which it exerciſes a power abſolute and ſupreme.

Perspicu

Matter acts upon matter by its ſolidity, figure, and motion. In theſe is contained its whole energy, and in theſe is ſummed up the whole effect.

But when it acts upon the mind, a variety of qualities, till then unknown, are firſt diſcovered. For to the mind it not only appears ſolid, figured, and moveable, but enriched with beautiful colours; grateful to the taſte; perfumed with pleaſant odours; and yielding ſweet harmonious ſounds. So that all material objects, in themſelves, and to each other, are dark and naked: to the mind alone they are cloathed in all the pleaſing variety of ſenſible qualities.

Mind, like a bride from a nobler family, enriches matter by its union, and brings as a dower, poſſeſſions before unknown.

known. Henceforth matter appears cloathed in a gayer and richer garment; and the fruits of this union are a new progeny, to which matter, confining its alliance to its own family, could never have given birth.

The mind is conſcious of its own powers and properties; conſcious of its power of perception, judgment, memory, and will.

If the mind were material, would it not likewiſe be conſcious that it poſſeſſed the properties of matter? For a no conſcious being, it ſhould ſeem, muſt be conſcious of its own moſt intimate powers and properties.

But the mind is not conſcious of its oav ſolidity or extenſion, its dimenſions, or figure. On the contrary, whilſt it is conſcious that it thinks, perceives, and wills, and that theſe powers are in itſelf, it ſeems, by its ſenſes, to perceive, hardneſs, reſiſtance, rough and ſmooth, out of itſelf. It has no notion or conception of theſe properties of matter but what it obtains by foreign information, derived from outward bodies through the organs of ſenſe. By theſe channels alone the knowledge of matter and its properties is conveyed to the mind. Whereas if the mind itſelf were material, it ſhould ſeem that its firſt acquaintance with the properties of matter ſhould be by a knowledge of itſelf, and a contemplation of its own nature.

Contest this

If the mind were material, and a power of thinking ſuperadded, then one would expect that it ſhould be more intimately conſcious of that part of its nature which is original and fundamental,

tal, than of that which is additional and acceſſory. Whereas, on the contrary, that which is ſuppoſed to be additional and acceſſory, is the only part that is intimately known, and is the ſubject of conſciouſneſs; that which is ſaid to be original, radical, and inherent is known only by ſenſe. That is, it finds within itſelf a knowledge of its additional and dependent powers; the knowledge of its underived and eſſential properties muſt be ſought for out of itſelf, and muſt be ſupplied by a correſpondence and intercourſe with diſtant and foreign bodies.

Conſciouſneſs, according to this ſuppoſition, inſtead of penetrating the ſoul, and entering into its very eſſence, ſeems only to touch its external parts, and to play upon its ſurface.

L

grant

Upon the whole therefore: our own perſonal experience, and every direct obſervation that hath been made upon the mind itſelf; together with the inſufficientcy of every other hypotheſis to account for its operations by material and mechanical agency, tend to convince us, that the mind is not material; but that joined to this organized body there is within us a different ſubſtance, an immaterial ſpirit, of an higher and diviner original, and endowed with better and ſuperiour properties and powers.

D

When the outward object hath made its impreſſion, and ſtamped the idea, the paſſive organ hath then done its part, and the reſt is accompliſhed by the preſiding mind. Which, like a ſkilful artiſt, goes to work upon the materials furniſhed by the ſenſes; comparing, ſelecting, analyſing, and abſtracting; till by placing them in different points of view their fitneſs, relations, and dependencies are ſeen. Then the firſt rays of truth break in upon the mind; the principles of knowledge are eſtabliſhed; and the powers of reaſon are employed. Led by the light of truths already known, new truths are daily diſcovered; the bounds of knowledge are gradually enlarged; and the mind is all enlightened.

A block of marble is hewn from the quarry, and brought to PHIDIAS a rude and ſhapeleſs maſs. He works upon it, reduces it into ſhape, gives it form and proportion, and a beautiful ſtatue is produced. Is PHIDIAS himſelf who performed the work, a fragment from a rock? and is the idea of beauty after which

no

which he worked no more than a marble image within him?

But the difference is much greater between the ideas of ſenſe, the materials upon which the mind firſt begins its work, and the truths produced by its operations, than between the rough marble, and the ſtatue formed by the ſkill of PHIDIAS.

Let matter then be allowed to furniſh the firſt materials; the enlightened mind, which by its operations upon theſe diſcovers truth, and purſues it through all its diſtant connections, muſt have powers as far ſuperiour to that which gave the firſt impreſſion, as PHIDIAS is ſuperiour to the marble.

18 AP 68

F I N I S.